

# The Other September 11: Teaching about the 1973 Overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende

Katy Benedetto, Alexandra Lamb, and Robert Cohen

September 11, 2001, is a day most American high school students remember. They may not fully grasp the events that took place, the reasons behind the terrorist attacks on the United States, or their implications, but they remember. They were children when this national trauma occurred—and they saw those unforgettable television images of the World Trade Center exploding and the Pentagon aflame. Every fall they see somber commemorations of the September 11 attacks and the tragic loss of life left in their wake. But what few of our students—or other Americans—know is that long before 2001, September 11 has been a tragic historical anniversary in Latin America because it was the day that Chile’s democratically elected president, Salvador Allende, was overthrown and died in a bloody coup in 1973. The coup marked the start of a dismal era for Chilean democracy because it led to more than a decade of military rule by Augusto Pinochet, whose brutal dictatorship (1973–1990) consolidated itself via crimes against humanity—the disappearance, torture, and murder of thousands of dissidents.

At first glance, the U.S. and Chilean September 11ths seem most impressive for what they have in common, which is, quite simply, terror: buildings were destroyed and civilians were killed in the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, and a violent and bloody coup was followed by the installation of a dictator who ruled by terror in Chile in 1973. But there is an important difference between the two tragedies, a difference that Chilean novelist, playwright, and human rights activist Ariel Dorfman urges Americans to reflect upon. The difference is that while in 2001 America was the victim of terror, in

1973, the U.S. took part in perpetrating the terror, having helped to destabilize the Allende government and covertly supported a military coup that resulted in one of the most brutal dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. Dorfman warns: “Beware the plague of amnesia, America.... Have ... you forgotten the Democratic Chile? Demonized, destabilized by your government in 1973? ... Misruled for seventeen years by a dictator you helped install?”<sup>1</sup>

Teaching about Chile’s September 11 offers us an opportunity to present our students with the complexity and contradictions of U.S. foreign policy. While

the U.S. almost always uses the rhetoric of democracy to defend its international role, there are times when it has actually sabotaged democratic governments abroad in instances when those governments challenge U.S. economic interests and geo-political goals. Such was the case in Allende’s Chile in 1973. Teachers who take on this fascinating case study face the challenging task of conveying how the U.S. could have undermined Chilean democracy given the historical tradition of valuing freedom, democracy, and self-determination. It forces our students to consider whether a democratic frame makes sense in assessing U.S. policy towards Latin America during the Cold War, and whether the radical critique of the U.S. as an imperialist or neo-colonial power actually has merit in helping to explain the Nixon administration’s Chilean policy. Examining this important moment can help students empathize with other nations that have experienced tragedies, and become more acutely aware of the meaning of democracy in the face of such wild contradictions. When situations like these are studied and debated in classrooms, students practice being active and critical citizens in an increasingly complex

world and can better participate in ongoing debates regarding the at times violent repercussions of U.S. foreign policy.<sup>2</sup>

This article and the teaching suggestions that follow aim to provide a better understanding of Chile's September 11 by examining relevant literature, a primary source document, and essays by some of the event's witnesses (e.g., writings by Ariel Dorfman). We offer a teaching activity centering on one of the most revealing historical sources on the U.S. role in Allende's Chile, a declassified five-point memorandum written to President Richard Nixon on November 17, 1970, by his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger. It outlines covert measures that the U.S. government planned to use to undermine and subvert Allende's presidency, illuminating the breadth of American influence abroad and directly implicating the U.S. government in some of the chaotic events that wracked Chile in the early 1970s, which destabilized the Allende government and paved the way for the rise of Pinochet. The covert, even conspiratorial, nature of Nixon and Kissinger's actions leading up to the coup is highly engrossing, leaving students to follow and question what happened with the same rapt attention they might pay to a true crime story.

Our experience teaching about the fall of Allende and using the declassified Kissinger memorandum in an American Studies class at New York City's Stuyvesant High School demonstrated the impact that these complex issues can have on students. This study of the memorandum was a way to promote student engagement with primary source analysis. The follow-up discussion of United States covert activities and interventions in Latin America led to a heated classroom debate about American foreign policy and the government's obligations to the public regarding the disclosure of information about such events. Some students were appalled by U.S. subversion of the Chilean democratic process, while others were impressed by the Nixon administration's justification for undermining Allende, asserting



Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (L) and General Augusto Pinochet (C) stand with two unidentified men in this undated file photo.

(Reuters/STR New)

that the U.S. was “protecting freedom” in Chile because freedom was defined in Cold War terms.<sup>3</sup> In those terms, Allende was seen not as a democratically-elected president whose government commanded respect, but as a dangerously radical socialist whose opposition to American corporate dominance of the Chilean economy constituted a threat to U.S. economic interests and free enterprise. Nixon also saw undermining Allende as a way of preventing Chile from aligning with the Soviet Union, the major anti-capitalist superpower. In that way too, the U.S. involvement could be seen as an act in the service of freedom. But all of our students grappled with the question of whether such economic interests and geo-political goals justified a U.S. plot to undermine a president who had been democratically elected by his own people.

Such questions loan themselves to a debate as lively as the important task of evaluating the proper role for the United States as an international superpower, probing the line between national self-interest and imperialism, capitalist interests and democratic ideals. They also force us to acquaint ourselves with anti-Americanism, and why the United States is often seen abroad as an arrogant bully

that does not respect the sovereignty of smaller nations. This topic and our teaching suggestions are part of a conversation about U.S. foreign policy at large, as it is essential for students to gain a perspective on their country's controversial role as a global power. The study of the September 11 coup in Chile and the U.S.'s role offers an opportunity to explore difficult and emotional subject matter through primary and secondary sources, utilizing the skills of understanding, questioning, unpacking, and reevaluating the American historical narrative.

### **Nixon, Kissinger, and the Cold War**

*Nothing important can come from the South. History has never been produced in the South. The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to Washington and then goes to Tokyo. What happens in the South is of no importance.*

—Kissinger, speaking to Chilean Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdés<sup>4</sup>

These remarks by Kissinger to Chile's foreign minister in 1969 exemplify the Nixon administration's outlook on Latin America. Nixon's troubled history with this region dates back to the Eisenhower years. In 1958, Nixon, while conducting a goodwill tour of South America as Eisenhower's vice president, confronted demonstrators expressing hostility and anti-American sentiment. The outcry was most notable in Venezuela, where he was spit upon, attacked with rocks, and had his car nearly overturned by a mob. The idea that Latin Americans might have legitimate grievances escaped Nixon, and instead he believed that they were "primitive, easily led, and lacking in the ability to govern themselves."<sup>5</sup> Kissinger gave every indication that he considered the area inconsequential and its people ignorant. He and Nixon dealt with challenges from Latin America in a heavy-handed manner that contrasted with the careful meticulous way that they approached negotiations with stronger nations such as China and the Soviet Union. As Latin American expert Stephen Kinzer observed, when Nixon and Kissinger encountered problems "from weak, vulnerable nations like Chile, they reacted with blind emotion rather than the cool long-term interest that guided their approach to Moscow and Beijing."<sup>6</sup>

Although Cold War tensions abated thanks to the policy of *détente* that took hold by the end of the Nixon era, issues of national security related to Cold War geo-politics were continually important to the Nixon administration. Kissinger popularized the notion that Americans did not need to focus on the possibility of an all out war provoked by the Soviet Union, but instead on more limited or local conflicts in peripheral areas.<sup>7</sup> Chile was one of these peripheral aspects of the Cold War, which still needed watching over to prevent Latin America from falling to communism. Nixon later stated that he had heeded warnings from advisors (including businessmen with interests in Chile) that socialist regimes in Cuba and Chile would turn all of Latin America

into a "red sandwich."<sup>8</sup> In support of his belligerently anti-Allende policies, Kissinger noted "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people."<sup>9</sup> This was a view that paved the way for U.S. violations of Chilean sovereignty.

### **Towards September 11, 1973**

What took place in Chile on September 11, 1973, was the culmination of three years of covert and overt U.S. activities aimed at bringing down Allende and his Popular Unity government. Allende was deemed a threat by Nixon and Kissinger (though not by the State Department's Latin American experts) because of his socialist leanings, close friendship with Fidel Castro, and plan to force out American businesses that controlled many of the country's leading industries. Cold War tensions of the time caused Nixon to fear that if Allende came into power, Chile would become another Cuba, and a satellite of the Soviet Union. Prompted by multinational corporation International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) and other American and Chilean business leaders, the U.S. government in 1970 embarked on a covert "spoiling campaign" to block Allende's election. With a budget of \$135,000, later increased to \$390,000, the CIA spread anti-Allende propaganda in the form of posters, newly opened news agencies, and the creation or support of anti-communist civic action groups. Regarding Allende, Richard Nixon privately remarked, "We're going to smash him."<sup>10</sup>

Many essential questions are raised by the study of the Chilean intervention. The first is the degree to which big business special interests should be allowed to impact U.S. foreign policy. Some major American companies stood to lose economically if Allende pushed them out of Chile—even if he compensated them for their losses—and so they effectively lobbied Nixon to oppose Allende. Were Nixon and Kissinger truly acting in U.S. national interests by waging economic and political warfare against Allende?

Or were they merely serving the selfish interests of such corporations as ITT, Pepsico, Kennecott Copper Corporation, Anaconda Copper Mining Company, Firestone Tire and Rubber, Bank of America, Ralston Purina, and Dow Chemical?<sup>11</sup> The natural inquiry that follows regards Chile's rights in this matter. Allende believed that some of these companies were exploiting the Chilean people and lands for their own profit. In 1968, studies showed that the 28.3 percent of the Chilean people earning the least amount of money received 4.8 percent of the national income, while the 2 percent of the population earning the most received 45.9 percent of the income.<sup>12</sup> Allende ran for the presidency in 1958, 1964, and finally with success in 1970, on a platform advocating land reform, nationalization of major industries (especially copper), closer relations with socialist and communist countries, and progressive redistribution of income. The question becomes: If a Chilean political leader such as Allende opts for socialistic reforms in order to promote greater economic equity, does the U.S. have the right to stop him in order to preserve the profit margins of the American companies with interests there? The United States thought so during that period, and helped provide funding to anti-Allende politicians who defeated him in each of the elections prior to 1970. How, we finally asked our students, would Americans react if a foreign power helped to bankroll U.S. politicians and swayed American elections in their favor?

Despite the U.S.'s best efforts, Allende was elected by a plurality on September 4, 1970. The CIA proceeded to launch an even more extensive operation to oust him, initially through legal and diplomatic means (known as Track 1), but increasingly by attempting to foment a military coup (Track 2). They continued their earlier propaganda campaign, but raised the stakes by subsidizing opposition newspapers, labor unions, and political parties, blocking international loans, denying spare parts to industries,

## 1. Focus or Preview Activity

Open the class to a discussion about September 11, 2001, and what they remember about that day. Allow the class time to explore their feelings, ask questions, and discuss how what happened has shaped the United States since. Begin a discussion about violence and terrorism in general, and ask if they can think of any other events that were as shattering as this one. They may suggest Pearl Harbor, acts of terrorism in the Middle East, and military coups in Asia or Latin America.

Explain to students that you are going to read about another 9/11. Ask if they know what you are referring to, and provide background information regarding the military coup in Chile in 1973 through the use of data, maps, and other visual aids. Have students take turns reading aloud Ariel Dorfman's chapter, "The Last September 11." Ask the following questions about the article:

- Dorfman compares the tragic events of September 11, 2001, in the U.S. with the tragedy of Allende's overthrow in Chile on September 11, 1973. Why does he make this comparison? In what ways does it seem valid? Are there ways in which this comparison seems problematic?
- How was the U.S. role in Chile's September 11 different than its role in the September 11, 2001, tragedy?
- What does Dorfman mean when he refers (on page 41) to "America's famous exceptionalism"? Why is he so critical of exceptionalism? Why does he want the U.S. to stop thinking about itself this way?
- Dorfman argued shortly after September 11, 2001, that "a crisis of this magnitude can lead to renewal or destruction, it can be used for good or for evil, for aggression or for reconciliation, for vengeance or for justice, for the militarization of a society or its humanization." Have any of his predictions come true since then? How?

Follow up the reading with a journal writing activity making comparisons between the two 9/11s and eliciting empathy about the universal experience of violence.

## 2. Document Analysis

Provide students with a copy of the featured memorandum between Kissinger and Nixon. As a class, review the significance of the following terms and names: Covert Action, Committee of 40, Marxist/non-Marxist, contingency budget, Kissinger, Nixon, Allende, classified/unclassified. Explain the background and motivation of the covert action program. Elicit a discussion about the plan and whether the U.S. was justified in its actions in Chile. Discuss American interests, ideologies, and fears of the time. Divide

the class into pairs to discuss the document. Each pair should:

- List forms that each "principal element" could take.
- List ways in which each action will impact Chile and its people.

Have students report back to class and debate the strengths and weaknesses of the plan.

Divide the class into groups. Each group should imagine that they are a part of the Chilean government's cabinet, and reading this document right after it was written. They must make a list of ways to counteract and prevent each of the measures to subvert their government. They will then compose a memorandum in the same format as the American document based on their ideas. Continue with a class discussion imagining how the American people would have reacted if the document had been leaked in 1970. Ask students to discuss and weigh the reactions of different groups. How would Nixon's supporters have reacted? How would Nixon's opposition have reacted?

## 3. Presidential Doctrines

Divide the class into groups of 4–5. Assign each group a different presidential doctrine to research, (e.g., the Monroe doctrine, the Nixon doctrine, the Carter doctrine, and the Bush doctrine) and literature about each doctrine's application in Latin America. Each group should answer the following questions:

- What attitude toward foreign countries does this doctrine reflect?
- Why do you think that the president held this view?
- Give an example of how this doctrine was applied in Latin America.
- Do you think that the doctrine was fair? Why or why not?

Jigsaw the students and have them compare their answers. One member of each group reports back to class.

## 4. Comparative Research Activity

Split the class into groups and have them research different Latin American countries where U.S. intervention led to regime change (e.g., Guatemala, Cuba, Nicaragua). Ask students to create documentaries based on their research that draw comparisons to the coup in Chile. Students can film and edit a documentary or create a website or podcast showing what they have learned. Students should present their work to the class.

and paying for and sparking a nationwide trucker's strike that all but paralyzed the economy.<sup>13</sup> A later U.S. Senate investigation estimated that Washington spent \$8 million overall on its destabilization campaign in Chile, \$3 million of which was spent in 1972 alone.

In one of the most chilling aspects of the Track 2 campaign, Allende's commander-in-chief of the army, General Rene Schneider, was assassinated. A strict constitutionalist, Schneider had been a key obstacle to the covert U.S. plan to use the Chilean military to prevent Allende's election, since he, much like George Washington, believed that in a democracy civilian rule, not military might, ought to prevail. While the CIA had arranged for his kidnapping rather than his murder, those "men of violence" it had selected to deal with the "Schneider problem" ended up—after two botched abduction attempts—shooting him fatally, an attack expedited by U.S. weapons and money sent by diplomatic pouch.<sup>14</sup>

As part of the Track 2 campaign, the CIA cultivated contacts in the Chilean military among the soldiers who would ultimately overthrow Allende, most notably the disloyal army commander, Augusto Pinochet. On September 11, the Pinochet-led military surrounded the presidential palace with tanks, armored cars, riflemen and jet fighters. When they demanded that Allende either resign or surrender, he refused the ultimatum, and they proceeded to storm the palace, resulting in Allende's death—apparently by suicide. In the days that followed, Pinochet was installed as president, and all of Chile's democratic institutions were dissolved. Allende's policies and programs were dismantled, and a wholly "free-market" economy was reestablished, much to the satisfaction of the U.S. multinational companies that had been affected by his tenure.<sup>15</sup>

While it was Chilean soldiers, not Americans, who stormed the presidential palace, the coup was only possible because the U.S. destabilization cam-

paign had badly damaged Chile's economy and undermined the Allende regime. The plotters, moreover, might never have gone ahead with the military assault had not the Nixon administration made it so clear that it "would not look with disfavor" if a coup would occur. A 1975 U.S. congressional report concluded that Nixon administration officials "may not have always succeeded in walking the thin line between monitoring indigenous coup plotting and actually stimulating it."<sup>16</sup> A private conversation between Nixon and Kissinger the week after the coup leaves no doubt that they took pride in having helped to foster the coup. Here Kissinger lamented that the liberal American press was "bleeding" instead of "celebrating" the overthrow of what he saw as Chile's communist government. "In the Eisenhower period we would be heroes," Nixon responded. "Well we didn't as you know—our hands don't show on this one though"; and Kissinger agreed that they "didn't do [the coup]" but "helped them—created the conditions as great as possible" to pave the way for the coup. "That is right," replied Nixon.<sup>17</sup>

The events in Chile on September 11, 1973, shattered the once democratic and peaceful traditions of the Chilean people and government. Today only half of all Chileans were alive on that day in 1973, but what happened has never left the national psyche. Accounts of the storming of the presidential palace, the assassinations and kidnappings, and the targeting and killing of leftists all over the country, are now numerous. Yet Pinochet, who followed the coup with a 17-year dictatorship, repressed discussion of this conspiracy against democracy in Chile. The U.S. government prevented the world from knowing the full story of its role for many years by keeping its documents on the coup secret and classified. The story of the overthrow of a democratically-elected president and the coup that ended with him dead from a bullet wound to the head, and the U.S. role in these tragic events can now be told with more certainty because in 2000 the Clinton administration finally released

relevant CIA documents that implicated the U.S. government and Pinochet in the coup. The Chilean and American people can come to terms with the events of the other September 11, and begin to recover from their mutual tragedies of unprovoked terror.

Pinochet emerged as a cruel dictator, taking power immediately after the coup, and maintaining that power via the execution of over 3,200 people, the incarceration of at least 80,000 Chileans without trials, and the torture of 30,000.<sup>18</sup> After finally falling from power, Pinochet faced some 300 criminal charges, the most serious of which were human rights violations, but which also included tax evasion and embezzlement. He was able to avoid trial on the charges after the Chilean Supreme Court, in 2002, judged him medically unfit for reasons of age-related dementia. Kissinger's indifference to Pinochet's brutality becomes evident in light of his remarks during a secret June 1976 meeting with the Chilean dictator documented in a recently released report about human rights abuses in Chile. Kissinger remarked, "My evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government that was going Communist."<sup>19</sup>

Below is an excerpt from Ariel Dorfman's *Chile: The Other September 11* about his feelings towards both those tragic days. His comparison of the two September 11ths can serve as a preview reading to put students in the shoes of a Chilean witness and victim of the 1973 coup:

...What I recognize is something deeper, a parallel suffering, a similar pain, a commensurate disorientation, echoing what we lived through in Chile as of that September 11. Its most extraordinary incarnation—I still cannot believe what I am witnessing—is that on the screen I see hundreds of relatives wandering the streets of New York, clutching the photos of their sons, fathers, wives, lov-

ers, daughters, begging for information, asking if they are alive or dead, the whole United States forced to look into the abyss of what it means to be *desaparecido* [disappeared], with no certainty or funeral possible for those beloved men and women who are

missing. And I also recognize and repeat that sensation of extreme unreality that invariably accompanies great disasters caused by human iniquity, so much more difficult to cope with than natural catastrophes. Over and over again I hear phrases that remind me of

what people like me would mutter to themselves during the 1973 military coup and the days that followed.... And words reiterated unceasingly, 28 years ago and now again in the year 2001: "We have lost our innocence. The world will never be the same."<sup>20</sup>

Memo from Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, November 25, 1970.\*

(un-log)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger  
SUBJECT: Covert Action Program -- CHILE

In addition to the actions outlined in my memorandum of November 25 (subject: Status Report on Chile), the 40 Committee has been reviewing a covert action program keyed to the overall policy towards Chile which you established at the NSC Meeting on November 5. The program has five principal elements:

1. Political action to divide and weaken the Allende coalition;
2. Maintaining and enlarging contacts in the Chilean military;
3. Providing support to non-Marxist opposition political groups and parties;
4. Assisting certain periodicals and using other media outlets in Chile which can speak out against the Allende Government; and
5. Using selected media outlets [redacted] <sup>25(1)</sup> [redacted] to play up Allende's subversion of the democratic process and involvement by Cuba and the Soviet Union in Chile.

The Committee approved development of the general plan proposed by CIA and a contingency budget, but will review each specific operation on a periodic basis.

Nachmanoff/vmr 11-25-78

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY~~

A classroom discussion of U.S. involvement in regime change can spark an intense debate about what it means to be an American, and the impact of U.S. foreign policy. Teaching students about American involvement in the Chilean coup raises essential questions that allow them to grapple with the conflicting mission of the United States to be both a democratic nation and a capitalist one. Within the United States these political and economic roles may be seen as complementing one another, offering citizens the opportunity to be economically and socially free of government intervention. Outside of its borders, however, they can conflict dramatically, as they did in Chile. U.S. covert actions saved American business interests, but at the expense of Chilean democracy—it was trampled by a dictator that the United States, helped to install. While Pinochet's interests were very much in line with American capitalistic investments, his violent and oppressive 17-year regime was in fact at odds with America's tradition of constitutional rights. When teaching about Chile, teachers should ask: if the American involvement in the Chilean coup was an effort to protect American values and interests abroad, does having a violent dictator in power achieve these goals?

### Classified Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon

The extent to which the United States intervened in the political and military affairs of Chile is revealed in the many U.S. government documents that have since been declassified.<sup>21</sup> We chose the memorandum written by Kissinger in 1970 to President Nixon, because it illuminates the American involvement in

\*Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet Files: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability* (New York: The New Press, 2003), 125.

Chile, which set the stage for the 1973 coup. The memorandum outlines tactics the American government planned to employ to “weaken the Allende coalition,” including using media outlets to accentuate the voices of opposition parties and strengthening relationships with the Chilean military. The memo illuminates the lengths to which the United States was willing to go to protect its interests in Chile, and allows students a direct look into the ideas and tactics Washington applied there.

The Allende coup is likely to engage students and allow them to delve into the complexities of American foreign policy, as well as to explore the tension between democracy and capitalism. Some teaching suggestions are included in the box on page 290. In an extended lesson on the subject that we taught at Stuyvesant High School in New York City, we found that the use of guiding questions to get students thinking about this controversy was key to its success. We began with a discussion of Ariel Dorfman’s essay “The Last September 11” and asked students to draw parallels between September 11, 2001, and September 11, 1973. They identified both events as “watershed moments in national history” in which each nation’s “sense of national identity was shattered.” We then segued into a historical discussion of our featured document, the memorandum sent to President Nixon from Kissinger on November 25th 1970. We asked students to read the document, discuss it briefly with their peers, and develop a set of counter-tactics that Allende’s cabinet members might have used if they had seen the document when it was written.

In the discussion that followed, two distinct tactics emerged. The students’ first suggestion was to implement a public campaign to build support for Allende through the growth of national sentiment and worldwide sympathy. Their second approach was harsher; they suggested a purge of the military and the media, an increase in government control of the media, and a strengthening of alliances with surrounding countries. A few others

thought that no defensive tactic could work since it was so difficult for a weaker nation such as Chile to stand up to the massive political, economic, and military might of America as a superpower.

We then changed the conversation and asked students to hypothesize American public reactions had the memorandum been leaked to news media in 1970. The students were able to empathize with both Nixon supporters and foes. They theorized that his supporters would accept the covert action as a method of protecting the American people from the threat of international communism. Students explained that the opposition would have viewed this memo as a threat as well, but a threat to American values of democracy and free speech.

A larger conversation ensued about the role of the American government in the affairs of other nations and the conflicting needs to support both capitalistic interests of the American economy and the more egalitarian interests of democracy. This discussion produced conflicting opinions within the classroom as to who gets to decide these major issues of American foreign policy. The question that naturally arose was: should the American people be privy to these conversations or should elected officials keep these actions hidden from public view? The class was divided on this question. We also asked students to examine the consequences of American participation in the overthrow of foreign governments, such as in Chile, Guatemala, Vietnam, and Iran. The structure and content of the lesson allowed students to draw their own conclusions about the cost and benefits of the interventions for both the American people and the citizens of these foreign nations. 📖

#### Notes

1. Ariel Dorfman, *Other Septembers, Many Americas: Selected Provocations, 1980-2004* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004), 12.
2. The theme of American foreign policy and interventions abroad is consistent with various NCSS standards. It directly correlates to NCSS Thematic Standard 10 **Power, Authority, and Governance**, which encourages teachers to “guide learners to explain and evaluate how governments attempt to achieve their stated ideas at home and abroad.” In addition, it

addresses NCSS Thematic Standard 12 **Global Connections**, which suggests that teachers “guide learner analysis of the relationships and tensions between national sovereignty and global interests in such matters as territorial disputes, economic development, nuclear and other weapons deployment, use of natural resources, and human rights concerns.” National Council for the Social Studies, *National Standards for Social Studies Teachers* (Washington, DC: NCSS, 1997), www.socialstudies.org.

3. Eric Foner, *The Story of American Freedom* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), 249-274.
4. Seymour Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), 263.
5. Lubna Z. Qureshi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2009), 3.
6. Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 199.
7. Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 49.
8. *Ibid.*, 233.
9. Hersh, 265.
10. Kinzer, 183.
11. *Ibid.*, 186.
12. Hersh, 259.
13. The leading American corporations active in Chile set out on a “quiet” destabilization plan of their own, closing offices, delaying payments, slowing deliveries and denying credit.
14. Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power*, 236; Christopher Hitchens, *The Trial of Henry Kissinger* (London: Verso, 2001), 66.
15. Ariel Dorfman, et al., *Chile: The Other September 11. An Anthology of Reflections on the 1973 Coup* (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2006), 95-96.
16. U.S. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations. *Covert Action in Chile: 1963-1973*. 94th Cong., 1st sess., 18 December 1975, 28.
17. Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power*, 511-512.
18. National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, authorized by Chilean President Patricio Aylwin, 1991. Truth Commissions Digital Collection, United States Institute of Peace; National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture Report, authorized by president Ricardo Lagos, 2004-2005. www.comisiontortura.cl/03\_cap\_ii.pdf.
19. Hitchens, 70.
20. Dorfman et al., *Chile: The Other Sept. 11*, 2-3
21. On the most recently released evidence of Nixon plotting to oust Allende, see “Memos Show Nixon’s Bid to Enlist Brazil in Coup,” *New York Times*, Aug. 16, 2009.

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